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125 YEARS SINCE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT:  




THE LAST ASSEMBLY OF 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT LAWYERS 
JOSEPH D. KEARNEY* 
I. 
Upon graduating from law school in 1989 and completing a one-year 
clerkship, I began my career as a lawyer at Sidley & Austin in Chicago, a 
firm whose clients over the decades have included railroads, electric 
utilities, and telecommunications carriers.  One of my first assignments 
involved a challenge to the emerging technology of “Caller ID.”  The 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission had cast doubt on the legality 
of the technology as proposed to be deployed by the local telephone 
company.  As counsel for a long-distance company, American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T), we were less concerned about the 
particular ruling than by its implications for our own interstate service.  I 
prepared a substantial brief on the matter, but among its legal 
arguments I can recall today only the one that (like the man upon the 
stair) was not there.  For upon reading my draft, David W. Carpenter, 
an extraordinary lawyer and AT&T’s primary outside counsel at the 
time, said something to this effect: “It omits the best argument.”  And 
what was that?  “The filed rate doctrine,” came the answer.1  
                                                          
*  Dean and Professor of Law, Marquette University. 
1. In his work for AT&T, Carpenter was the successor to the legendary Howard 
J. Trienens, who simultaneously (in the early 1980s) had been the leader of Sidley & Austin 
and general counsel of AT&T—i.e., of the Bell System, the world’s largest industrial 
organization.  “Asked why he allowed Trienens to retain his Sidley & Austin partnership 
while at AT&T, [CEO Charlie] Brown replied that he needed the best lawyer in the world—
that is, Trienens—and he would get him any way he could.”  PETER TEMIN WITH LOUIS 
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So began my introduction to a legal world that even then seemed as 
much of the railroads as of telephones.  AT&T was required to file 
tariffs with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), setting 
forth its rates and (necessarily) its services.  Here is a succinct statement 
of this regime, frequently summarized as the filed rate doctrine: 
“Deviation from these tariffs is strictly prohibited under any 
circumstances, unless the regulatory commission concludes that the 
carrier’s rates fail to meet the statutory requirement of being just, 
reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory.”2  The model had 
been imported into the Communications Act of 1934 from the Interstate 
Commerce Act,3 whose great purpose upon its enactment in 1887 was to 
ensure that interstate railroads charged nondiscriminatory rates. 
Carpenter had done some impressive things with the filed rate 
doctrine.  In particular, in a series of cases involving electric utility 
companies, he (together with Rex E. Lee and others) had persuaded the 
Supreme Court that various state attempts to allocate or disallow certain 
costs were preempted by filings with the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (because state regulators could not tread on federally filed 
tariffs).4  Indeed, at the same time as the Caller ID matter, we seemed to 
be on the cusp of another victory in the Supreme Court based on the 
filed rate doctrine.5   
In a sense, none of this was novel.  The filed rate doctrine had been 
the law since 1895.6  It had proved powerful enough to oust the antitrust 
                                                                                                                                          
GALAMBOS, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS 204 n.80 
(1987).  The story at the firm sometimes included that Trienens had insisted on the joint 
arrangement because he did not want the AT&T position and believed that his retaining the 
law firm partnership was the one condition that Brown would have to regard as both 
reasonable and unacceptable. 
2. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1331 (1998) (“Even where a customer has been 
quoted a lower rate and has relied on that quotation, the Supreme Court has held that the 
tariff rate rather than the contract rate prevails.”). 
3. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); see Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).  
4. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986); Mississippi Power & 
Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988). 
5. The Court had granted certiorari in a case that seemed in important respects on all 
fours with Mississippi Power & Light: it even involved the same interstate utility system 
whose same filings with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission were said under the filed 
rate doctrine to preempt the local ratemaker’s disallowance of certain costs.  To be sure, the 
Fifth Circuit had seen it otherwise.  In all events, the parties settled the case after it was fully 
briefed and awaiting argument.  See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 
502 U.S. 954 (1991) (order dismissing certiorari pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46). 
6. See Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fé Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98, 101–03 (1895). 
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laws.7  And the same year as I learned of its existence, the Supreme 
Court rejected even the Interstate Commerce Commission’s attempt to 
soften the effect of the doctrine.  The agency had ruled that it was an 
unreasonable practice for a motor carrier to enforce a filed rate where 
the parties had explicitly negotiated a lower rate—that is, where there 
was a contract rate of the sort that typifies most business transactions.  
In Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.,8 the Court struck 
down this policy because, by allowing deviations from tariffs, it offended 
the nondiscrimination regime at the heart of the system and the Act 
itself. 
The effect of Maislin was that trustees in bankruptcy of motor 
carriers—there were many because of the deregulation and thus 
competition that the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 had engendered9—
proceeded against shippers who had entered into apparent contracts for 
lower rates and knew not of filed tariffs.  To many, the filed rate 
doctrine seemed out of place in the world of the 1990s.  The inequity of 
such shippers’ fate after Maislin attracted even popular attention, with 
CBS’s 60 Minutes running a story entitled “You’re Kidding.”10  Justice 
John Paul Stevens and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist were among 
the critics in the legal world, the former writing for them both in Maislin 
that “[t]he ‘filed rate doctrine’ was developed in the 19th century as part 
of a program to regulate the ruthless exercise of monopoly power by the 
Nation’s railroads” and that the Court “fail[ed] to appreciate the 
significance of the ‘sea change’ in the statutory scheme that has 
converted a regime of regulated monopoly pricing into a highly 
competitive market.”11 
Even most of those forming the majority in Maislin seemed almost 
relieved a few years later, in Reiter v. Cooper,12 when shippers—now 
proceeding within the Interstate Commerce Act paradigm by asserting 
the traditional defense that the filed rates were unreasonable—cobbled 
together a different argument that might protect at least some of them 
against the invocation of the filed rate doctrine by trustees in 
bankruptcy of failed motor carriers. 
                                                          
7. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922); Square D Co. v. Niagara 
Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 422–24 (1986). 
8. 497 U.S. 116 (1990). 
9. Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980). 
10. See 139 CONG. REC. 30,299 (1993) (statement of Mr. Danforth). 
11. 497 U.S. at 138–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
12. 507 U.S. 258 (1993). 
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The telecommunications legal world in which I was moving, during 
these years as a young lawyer, also struggled with the filed rate doctrine.  
The FCC wished to do without it.  Indeed, the agency for years excused 
all long-distance carriers besides our client, AT&T, from the statutory 
obligation to file their rates: the agency claimed that its authority to 
“modify” the tariffing obligation gave it sufficient authority.13  Carpenter 
led a team of us who persuaded the Supreme Court to set the record 
straight, with Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the Court and quoting 
one of the greatest cases decided under the Interstate Commerce Act: 
The tariff-filing requirement is . . . the heart of the common-
carrier section of the Communications Act.  In the context of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, which served as its model, this Court 
has repeatedly stressed that rate filing was Congress’s chosen 
means of preventing unreasonableness and discrimination in 
charges: “There is not only a relation, but an indissoluble unity 
between the provision for the establishment and maintenance of 
rates until corrected in accordance with the statute and the 
prohibitions against preferences and discrimination.”14 
                                                          
13. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1994) (permitting the FCC to “modify” any requirement of 
section 203, whose basic provision was that “every common carrier . . . shall . . . file” tariffs).  
The Communications Act of 1934, as originally enacted and as not materially revised 
thereafter, provided that the FCC “may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, modify 
the requirements made by or under authority of this section in particular instances or by a 
general order applicable to special circumstances or conditions.”  Ch. 652, § 203(b), 48 Stat. 
1064, 1071 (1934).  The language had been essentially copied from the Interstate Commerce 
Act—or, more precisely, from the Hepburn Act’s 1906 revision of section 6 of the 1887 Act.  
See Ch. 3591, § 2, 34 Stat. 584, 586 (1906).  
14. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 229–30 (1994) (quoting Texas & Pac. 
Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440 (1907)).  Although it escapes the attention of 
most modern administrative law scholars, Abilene has been variously described as a “famous 
opinion,” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910–21, at 653 (1984) (vol. 9 of the Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States), a “landmark” case, T.I.M.E. Inc. 
v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 473 (1959), and the “fountainhead” of the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine, 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.02, at 6 (1958).   
In all events, Abilene is a gem of statutory interpretation.  The Court held that the 
common law right of shippers to sue an interstate common carrier by rail for exaction of an 
unreasonable rate was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Act, despite the Act’s explicit 
provision saving all common law rights.  Justice (future Chief Justice) Edward White 
reasoned that the great purpose of the Act had been to protect against discriminatory rates 
and that permitting common law suits, with varying verdicts and judgments, would necessarily 
entail discrimination.  The filed rate was the only lawful rate unless and until it was found by 
the ICC to be unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of the Act.  
“[The saving clause] cannot in reason be construed as continuing in shippers a common law 
right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of 
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Justice Stevens was left in dissent to make the same point as in Maislin 
had been true of trucking—that “[t]he communications industry has an 
unusually dynamic character”—and to decry “a rigid literalism that 
deprives the FCC of the flexibility Congress meant it to have in order to 
implement the core policies of the Act in rapidly changing conditions.”15 
II. 
My purpose in remembering a few aspects of my early career is less 
to recall the filed rate doctrine and more to evoke the spirit of the age, 
as is captured in the struggle over the doctrine.  There seemed little 
doubt even then that we were nearing the end of an era.  Events would 
soon confirm it.  In 1995, I left Sidley & Austin for another clerkship; by 
the time I returned the next year, the legal landscape had changed 
unmistakably. 
Most prominent was the new Telecommunications Act of 1996.16  
The Act contained numerous provisions, including the termination of 
the Modification of Final Judgment—the Bell System consent decree 
that had provided one of the twin pillars of telecommunications 
regulation for more than a decade (the other pillar being the 
Communications Act of 1934) and that had provided perhaps the bulk 
                                                                                                                                          
the act.  In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.”  Abilene Cotton Oil, 204 U.S. 
at 446. 
Upon Chief Justice White’s death, Chief Justice Taft’s memorial included the following 
observation: 
 The capital importance which our railroad system has come to have in the 
welfare of this country made the judicial construction of the interstate commerce 
act of critical moment.  It is not too much to say that Chief Justice White in 
construing the measure and its great amendments has had more to do with placing 
this vital part of our practical government on a useful basis than any other judge.  
His opinions in the case of the Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. The Abilene Cotton 
Oil Co., and the cases which followed it, are models of clear and satisfactory 
reasoning which gave to the people, to state legislatures, to Congress, and the courts 
a much-needed knowledge of the practical functions the Commerce Commission 
was to discharge, and of how they were to be reconciled to existing governmental 
machinery, for the vindication of the rights of the public in respect of national 
transportation.  They are a conspicuous instance of his unusual and remarkable 
power and facility in statesmanlike interpretation of statute law.  
Proceedings on the Death of Chief Justice White, 257 U.S. v, xxv (1921). 
15. MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. at 235 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun & Souter, JJ., 
dissenting). 
16.  Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
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of my practice as a lawyer.17  Congress also gave the FCC the authority 
that it had so long sought and even claimed (unsuccessfully in the MCI 
v. AT&T case): specifically, it provided that the FCC could forbear from 
enforcing any regulation not necessary to accomplish the 
Communications Act’s purposes—including the tariffing requirement.18 
Less relevant to my practice and to the larger economy, but more 
symbolically notable, during this year Congress also eliminated the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.  A new entity had to be created, the 
Surface Transportation Board (STB), but not with the same 
independent-agency status—or with the same building on Constitution 
Avenue.19  And the authority afforded the STB over rail carriers was 
slight.20 
To be sure, some vestiges of the past remained.  I had the 
satisfaction of seeing a case in which I had been unsuccessfully involved 
in my first run at the law firm be overturned by the Supreme Court on 
the basis of the filed rate doctrine,21 more or less at the same time that 
even some well familiar with the doctrine were suggesting that the Court 
could no longer be counted on to have the stomach for it.22 
I made my own departure from this fading realm in becoming a law 
professor.  In recalling my time as an Interstate Commerce Act lawyer 
(of a sort) and the era of which I was part, I am not here trying to tie 
together all these changes in any sort of synthetic way.  Tom Merrill and 
I already sought to do this, in the article which bridged my transition 
from fulltime practice to academe.23 
Instead, my motivation frankly is sentimental, although it is not 
nostalgic.  By this, I mean that I do not consider myself (at least in this 
context) to be “of an older fashion,” in the sense that “much that I love 
                                                          
17. See generally Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the 
Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 
50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395 (1999). 
18. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 401, 110 Stat. 56, 128 (1996) 
(adding 47 U.S.C. § 160). 
19. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 701, 109 Stat. 803, 932 (1995). 
20. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 1337 & n.58. 
21. AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998). 
22. See Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515, 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Silberman, 
J., concurring) (citing recent Supreme Court authority in support of statement that, despite 
MCI, “[i]t is rather obvious that a number of justices are not comfortable with the hard logic 
of Maislin” and concluding “I lack confidence that the Court will adhere to the logic of 
Maislin and MCI when again faced with consequences that appear undesirable ex post”). 
23. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2. 
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has been destroyed or sent into exile.”24  I hold no brief for filed tariffs 
over contracts in a competitive world.  Yet, for the sentiment, the 
developing world of regulated industries law today rather resembles the 
larger culture, in that it has become fragmented.  One could handle 
rather well, I should think, a negotiation of a content contract for a local 
exchange company, in the world defined largely by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, without any sense of the Hepburn 
Act,25 or the Mann–Elkins Act,26 or any number of other amendments to 
the Interstate Commerce Act.  But less than a quarter century ago, as 
my own experience shows, a lawyer could not competently confront the 
new technology of Caller ID without some knowledge of the Interstate 
Commerce Act.  
So for those of us who grew up at least partly in the old world, there 
is some pleasure in remembering.  We hope that there is some value in 
the remembrance for others.   
We expect that there is.  The remembrance is not at the scale or 
scope of the law review symposia celebrating the 50th and 75th 
anniversaries of the Act—or even the rather more ambivalent 
observation of the 100th anniversary.27  Yet we have gathered an 
impressive collection of scholars.  The following essays range from a 
recollection of the beginning, in the essay by James W. Ely, Jr., of 
Vanderbilt University,28 to the interplay between the Interstate 
Commerce Act and the antitrust law enacted only three years later (the 
Sherman Act), as explored by the University of Chicago’s Randal 
C. Picker.29  Thomas W. Merrill, of Columbia University, discusses the 
unusual phenomenon of administered contracts in the Interstate 
Commerce Act’s regulatory scheme, suggesting that the form of 
                                                          
24. G.K. CHESTERTON, THE JUDGMENT OF DR. JOHNSON: A COMEDY IN THREE ACTS 
117 (1928). 
25. Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906). 
26. Ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910). 
27. See Interstate Commerce Commission Semi-Centennial Commemorative Issue, 5 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 288–808 (1937); Symposium on the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1–326 (1962); Symposium, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 1–178 (1987); see also 
FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Interstate Commerce Commission, in OF LAW AND LIFE & 
OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1956–
1963, at 235, 235–45 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965) (address marking the 75th anniversary of 
the Interstate Commerce Act). 
28. James W. Ely, Jr., The Troubled Beginning of the Interstate Commerce Act, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
29. Randal C. Picker, The Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act: Playing 
Railroad Tycoon, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1135 (2012). 
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regulation was more impressive than the fact.30  McGill University’s Paul 
Stephen Dempsey focuses on the Interstate Commerce Commission as 
an agency, taking us broadly from its creation to its demise.31  Judge 
Richard D. Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit points us to the future, 
sketching the possible relevance of the Interstate Commerce Act’s 
paradigm for modern debates over regulation.32  James B. Speta, of 
Northwestern University, with whom it was my privilege to convene this 
group, concludes with an assessment of the Act’s pertinence in an area 
with almost as much importance to the twenty-first century as railroads 
possessed in the nineteenth: namely, telecommunications.33   
There no doubt will be other remembrances of the Interstate 
Commerce Act in times to come.  One would imagine that, twenty-five 
years hence, the sesquicentennial will be marked.  Any such observance 
will have the benefit of greater critical distance.  Yet it will lack a 
substantial group of folks who can make some plausible claim to have 
grown up in the law, in some important sense, under the Interstate 
Commerce Act.  In all events, we invite you to read these essays and to 
join us in remembering it. 
                                                          
30. Thomas W. Merrill, The Interstate Commerce Act, Administered Contracts, and the 
Illusion of Comprehensive Regulation, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1141 (2012).  While we make no 
effort here to trace out each author’s career, it should not go unremarked that Merrill argued 
Maislin for the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
31. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
95 MARQ. L. REV. 1151 (2012). 
32. Richard D. Cudahy, The Interstate Commerce Act as a Model of Regulation, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 1191 (2012). 
33. James B. Speta, Supervising Discrimination: Reflections of the Interstate Commerce 
Act in the Broadband Debate, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1195 (2012). 
